Introduction
In an important article in the Journal of Political Economy, Martin Feldstein (1974) estimated that the introduction of the social security system had reduced personal saving by 50 percent, with serious consequences for capital formation and output. His conclusion was based on a consumer-expenditure function estimated with U.S. time-series data and incorporating a social security wealth variable of his construction.
This paper presents new evidence that casts considerable doubt on Feldstein's conclusion. First, the social security wealth variable used by Feldstein was seriously flawed as a result of a computer-programming error. Simply correcting this error substantially changes the estimated effect of social security on saving. Second, the statistical evidence depends upon assumptions which are embedded in the construction of the social security wealth variable-assumptions that are not demonstrably preferable, and are in some cases inferior, to alternative assumptions. These assumptions relate, first, to how individuals form their expectations about the social security benefits they expect to receive and the social security taxes they expect to pay and, second, to estimates of the number of workers, dependent wives, and surviving \vido\vs rvho \\.ill receive benefits. Adopting reasonable alternative :issurnptions leads to generall) \veaker estimates of the I-elationship l > r t~\ r e n social security and sa\ing. Finall), the estimated I-elationship t,et\veerl soci;il security 'lnd saving is acutely sensitive to the period of' estimation examined.
Review of the Time-Series Evidence
Fclclsteirl (1976) I -e k r s to the theor-etical basis of his ilnalysis as the "extentlet1 life-c)cle nlodel." P r i~a t e \oluntar) intel-gener-atiorlal tl-iinsf'el-s .Ire excluded, as is saving for-contingencies. All sa\ing dul--irlg ttlc ~vorking years is for the purpo5e of pr-o~iding consurnption during the period of' retirement.
C" r r e n these assumptions, Feldstein ( 1 9'74)argues that social secur-it! .
iit'f'ects ,in individual's saving through t\vo opposing for-ces.
( 1 ) Sa\ing is rccluccd I)ec.ause the availabilit) of benefits reduces the need to :iccurnulate assets for the retirement period-the "asset-substitutio~i cffect." ( 2 )S:i\ing is increased because the social secu~.ity benefit, in c o n j~~r l c t i o~i r\.ith the earnings test, induces earlier retirement. Earlier l.ctil.cnlerit means :I shorter span of ),ears of earnings and 21 longer pel-iod of' ~.etiremerlt. This, in turn, I-ecluir-es a highel-sa\ing ratc d~l l -i~l g h r calming. years to realize any gi\erl le\el of' retil-e~nent inc.ornc-the "I-etirenlcnt efttct."
T h c net effect on arl indi\iclu,il's saving depends upor) the I-elati~c st~.erlgtllw)f these offsetting forc.es. If the asset-sul)stitutio~i effect is stronger t11,ln the retir-crnent eff'ect, individual saving \vill be I-educed; if. o n the other hand, the retirement efftct is stronger-, saving \\.ill be incre,~secl. Feldstein turns to a n econometric analysis to r e s o l~e this 21 prio1.i a~nl,iguity concerning the net effect on saving.
I'he heart of' Felclsrein's stud! is rhe specification and estimation of an aggl-eg'lte consumption turlctiorl \vhich irlcludes a social security \ \ ealth (SS[I.) \ al-iable. I'he model is adapted from the life-cycle consunipriol~ f'uriction developed by Ando and Llocligliani ( 1963) . Felclstein i~lt~-ocluces trvo rle\v \ar-iables. T h e key variable is an estimate o f social securit! \ve~ilth. -I'\vo definition5 are used: Gross social securit\. ~vealthi5 the present \ d u e of the retir-errlent benefits anticipated by individuals; net social security wealth is gross social secur-it) \vealth rninus the present value of the social securit! taxes anticipated by curl-erlt rvo1.ker.s. .T'hese series are corlstr-uctecl by esti~nating future herlefits and taxes under-altel-native assuniptions about I-eal irltel-eat rates and gl.or\.th rates of' real per capita income. T h e other novel var-iahle used 11) Felclsteirl is corporate retained earnings. I n essence, this is a p~.ox) for the pel-manerlt cornponerit of capital gains.
T 
where C is consumer expenditures, YD is disposable income, RE is gross retained earnings, W is household wealth, and SSWG is gross social security wealth estimated at a real discount rate of 3 percent. Permanent income is measured by current and lagged disposable income. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. In separate replies to Barro (1978) and to Esposito (1978) , Feldstein (1978 Feldstein ( , 1979 The strongest theoretical challenge has come from Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1978 . He argues that the introduction of social security is likely to lead to offsetting changes in private intergenerational transfers so that the effect of social security on private saving is reduced or eliminated. His empirical evidence consists of a consumer-expenditure function similar to that of Feldstein but with additional variables included in the specification (the government surplus, the unemployment rate, and the stock of durable goods). Barro finds that the coefficient of social security wealth is not significantly different from zero.
In another major contribution, Darby (1979) argues that life-cycle saving provides only a partial explanation of individual saving behavior. He extends his earlier research (Darby 1975 (Darby , 1978 on the permanent-income consumption function by incorporating Feldstein's social security wealth variable in the specification. Although his results vary, depending upon the specification used and the periods covered, he concludes that the effect is probably smaller than that estimated by Feldstein.
Replicating the Feldstein Variable
The first step in our analysis was to replicate Feldstein's social security wealth series. A detailed description of the algorithm for constructing this variable is given in Leimer and Lesnoy (1980) . Briefly, gross social security wealth is an estimate of the actuarial value of the social security benefits which individuals expect to receive. Net social security wealth is equal to gross social security wealth less an estimate of the actuarial value of the social security taxes which individuals expect to pay. As such, these measures should reflect changes over time in such factors as the population age structure, social security coverage, and benefit and tax rules.
A number of important assumptions are embedded in Feldstein's algorithm for computing social security wealth. He assumes that people expect the ratio of benefits per beneficiary to per capita disposable income to be constant over time. T h e number of persons expecting future social security retirement benefits is estimated by the number of current covered workers adjusted for differences in labor force participation by age. The number of women who expect to \ receive dependent wife or widow benefits is based on the number of current male covered workers and retirees. The sensitivity of Feldstein's conclusions to these key assumptions is examined in subsequent sections. 
SS WG Ratio
T h e result of our replication attempt for the gross social security wealth series is shown in table 1 for selected years. The replica series tracks the original Feldstein series quite well until 1956; beginning in 1957, the Feldstein series grows much more rapidly until, by 1974, it is almost 40 percent larger than the replica series.
The divergence is the result of a computer-programming error. This error, acknowledged by Feldstein, results in a cumulatively growing overestimate of the value of social security wealth for surviving widows. Correction of this error yields a series which is quite close to our replica s e r i e~.~ Regression results comparing the Feldstein specification using our replica series with those using the original Feldstein series are presented in Appendix table A1 and summarized in table 2.3 The specification of the consumer-expenditure function is the same as Feldstein (1978) . The difference in results is dramatic. For the full period, 1930-74 (excluding the war years), the coefficient for gross social security wealth falls from .026 to .011 and becomes insignificant. For net wealth, the coefficient drops from .037 to .009, and the t-ratio plummets to .5. The results for the postwar period, 1947-74, are also ~t r i k i n g .~ When the replica variable is used, the Leimer and Lesnoy (1980) . Feldstein (1980;  (Feldstein 1974) which used data only coefficients on both gross and net social security wealth become negative and significant. It should be noted that a negative coefficient is consistent with the extended life-cycle hypothesis. That is, for this specification, the coefficient of SSW is intended to measure both the asset-substitution and retirement effects of social security. If the retirement effect is larger than the asset-substitution effect, then the SSW coefficient should be negative.
T h i s comparison is based o n Feldstein's initial corrected series for 1937-74 as reported in

this issue) reports a revised series for 1937-76. T h e results for the equation based o n Feldstein's original gross wealth series for the period 1930-74 (which Feldstein refers t o as 1929-74) d i f f e r slightly f r o m t h e results reported i n eq. ( 3 ) above since we use slightly different data for the other variables. Regression results using Feldstein's o w n corrected series are essentially the same as those using our replica series. T h e results for the postwar period using Feldstein's original series through 1974 d i f f e r markedly f r o m his first published results
The absolute sizes of the estimated negative coefficients in table 2 are, however, implausible. The coefficient of gross SSW implies that, in the absence of social security, real personal saving in 1974 would be $114.8 billion lower (in 1972 dollars); the net wealth coefficient implies that saving would be reduced by $89.9 billion. Since actual personal saving in 1974 was $61.3 billion, both coefficients imply the absurd result that personal saving would have been negative in the absence of social security. More likely, the SSW variable is measuring the effect of some omitted variable or a structural change in the postwar period. But clearly, the results based on the Feldstein replica variables do not provide statistically significant support for the hypothesis that social security decreased personal saving.
Alternative Perceptions
We now examine how the estimated effect of social security wealth on consumer expenditures is affected by substituting alternative benefit assumptions in the Feldstein algorithm. Feldstein (1974, p. 911) explains his benefit perception assumption: "In estimating the average through 1971. In particular, the coefficient of gross social security wealth for the period 1947-71, although insignificant, was only slightly smaller, .014, than the coefficient for the period 1929-71, ,021. As shown in table A l , retained earnings are also no longer significant for either period when data through 1974 are used. value of future benefits for a single surviving annuitant, it would be wrong to assume that the schedule of benefits provided by law in year t would remain in effect. The history of social security shows continually rising benefit levels, a fact that individuals no doubt perceive when they contemplate the order of magnitude of their own benefits at retirement age. The ratio of annual benefits for retired workers (excluding dependents' benefits) to per capita disposable income has varied without any trend around a mean level of 0.41." Figure 1 plots the ratio of average benefits in current payment status to disposable income per capita for men and for women over the period 1940-77. Whether or not one perceives a trend in the data, it is clear that the ratio shows considerable variation. This variation reflects changes in disposable income per capita during periods when the benefit structure was unchanged as well as a number of ad hoc and, in the later years, automatic benefit increases legislated by Congress. Whether individuals adapted their benefit expectations to this variation, ignored it, or formed their expectations in entirely different ways is clearly open to speculation. Thus, it is important to examine the sensitivity of estimated social security wealth effects to the underlying perception assumptions.
Since we do not know how people form their perceptions of expected future benefits, we consider a number of reasonable ways in which individuals might form their estimates of the expected ratio of benefit per recipient to disposable income per ~a p i t a .~ .At one extreme, as Feldstein assumes, individuals might expect that a constant ratio of benefits to disposable income will be maintained over time. At the other extreme, individuals might expect that the current benefit ratio will be maintained. Or individuals might form their expectations adaptively, considering the history of past benefit ratios as well as the current ratio. Another perception assumes that individuals use published actuarial projections to estimate future changes in the current benefit ratio. The final perception we consider assumes that the individual is able to forecast perfectly the future course of the benefit ratio. This "perfect-foresight" assumption corresponds to the tax perception adopted by Feldstein (1974) .6 For the Feldstein constantratio perception, we adopt the same assumption that Feldstein (1978 Feldstein ( , 1979 used in extending his SSW series to 1974; that is, the average benefit ratio for the period 1940-71 is used for the entire period 1937-74. All of the other perceptions assume that individuals continually adjust their benefit expectations in response both to changing income levels and to amendments to the social security law, including the major amendments in 1950 and 1972. In addition to these perceptions, we also considered variants which assume that benefits remain constant in real terms after retirement rather than increasing at the same rate as per capita income. The results for these variants do not differ substantially from the results reported below.
The gross and net social security wealth series constructed using these alternative perceptions are presented in Appendix tables A4 and A5. The benefit and tax ratio perception assumption was the only assumption in the Feldstein replica algorithm which was modified in computing these series.
Consumer-expenditure functions estimated for the period 1930-74 using these alternative variables appear in table A2 of the Appendix. Results using the gross social security wealth variable are summarized in the upper portion of column 1 in table 3.7 The most important inference is that, regardless of which benefit perception is used, the coefficient of social security wealth is insignificant. For the These perception assumptions, along with a number of other variants with similar results, are described in detail in Leimer and Lesnoy (1980) . Individuals are assumed to anticipate correctly benefit ratios at retirement through 1977 (the last year for which data are available) and, after 1977, anticipate that benefit ratios remain at 1977 levels. After retirement, individuals are assumed to anticipate correctly actual changes in benefit levels through 1980 and, after 1980, anticipate constant real benefit levels. Table 3 summarizes regression results using the gross social security wealth variable only. Results using the net social security wealth variable are similar and are presented in the Appendix for the full period 1930-74. constant-ratio and perfect-foresight perceptions, the coefficients of SSW are about .O1 with t-ratios slightly larger than one. T h e remaining perceptions yield coefficients close to zero with minuscule t-ratios.
If we ignore the fact that all the social security wealth coefficients are statistically insignificant, these coefficients imply decreases in saving in 1974 ranging from $0.7 to $28.0 billion. Actual real saving in 1974 was $61.3 billion.
An Alternative Algorithm
In trying to replicate the Feldstein social security wealth variable, we became aware of several shortcomings in the underlying assumptions and felt it important to test whether the estimated results were sensitive to a more careful construction of the variable. A major weakness of the Feldstein construction involves his estimate of the number of persons who will become eligible for the various types of social secu-rity benefits. In particular, his construction algorithm (i) fails to adjust for the substantial changes which have occurred over time in the conditional probability of becoming insured for benefits given the individual's current covered employment status, (ii) ignores the important changes which have occurred over time in the proportion of women eligible for retired worker benefits compared with those eligible only for dependent wife and surviving widow benefits, (iii) substantially overestimates the number of aged nonbeneficiary social security wealth holders, and (iv) fails to count many current female beneficiaries. Our algorithm corrects these shortcomings and, in addition, incorporates the changes in life expectancy which have occurred since 1930 and adjusts the social security wealth series for consistency with NIPA population data.s A detailed description of the algorithm used to construct our social security wealth variables is given in Leimer and Lesnoy (1980) .9
Consumer-expenditure functions estimated for the period 1930-74 using the Leimer-Lesnoy social security wealth variables appear in Appendix table A3 and are summarized in the bottom half of column 1 in table 3. The coefficients of social security wealth for all perceptions are close to zero with very small t-ratios and imply little or no -' effect on saving. Clearly, the improved algorithm provides no evidence to support the view that social security has reduced saving.
The Period of Estimation
The estimated relationship between consumer expenditures and social security wealth is extremely sensitive to the period of estimation. Thus far, we have considered the full period, 1930-74, excluding the years around World War 11, 1941-46 . When the Feldstein replica algorithm is used, the social security wealth coefficients for this period are essentially zero except for the constant-ratio and perfect-foresight perceptions, which have positive, but insignificant, coefficients. Similarly, the coefficients of the Leimer-Lesnoy variables social security wealth is now negative. The coefficients are significant only for the constant-ratio and perfect-foresight perceptions, however, and the absolute values of these coefficients appear unreasonably large.ll In any event, the postwar evidence is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis that social security reduces saving.12
T o explain the small t-ratios he obtains for the postwar period, Feldstein argues that there is insufficient variation in the variables over that period to obtain precise estimates of the coefficients (see, e.g., Feldstein 1979, pp. 37, 39) . The results reported in table 3 do not support this argument. On the other hand, inclusion of the prewar period has its own problems. This period was one of extraordinary trauma and change. The social security program was in its infancy. Estimates of social security wealth are particularly suspect during this period since no benefits were paid until 1940, and these were based on a benefit formula radically different from that passed in 1935. The social security wealth series begin in 1937, the first year for which coverage data are available. But workers may well have formed some perceptions of social security wealth as early as 1935, when the original law was passed.
There are many reasons for maintaining a degree of skepticism about results based on data including the prewar period. Perhaps the most important is the sensitivity of the results to the specific years included. For example, suppose that we simply drop 1930 from the estimation period and use 1931 as the initial year. Results for this period are summarized in column 3 of table 3. Simply dropping 1930 from the data set has the effect that all coefficient estimates for social security wealth become negative, including those calculated when the Feldstein replica algorithm is used. Again, while none of the social security wealth coefficients estimated for this period is significant, there is certainly no evidence of a negative relationship between social security and saving.
It is important to note that our conclusions do not depend on whether the terminal year of the time periods is 1971, as in Feldstein (1974 , as in Feldstein (1978 . The only variable in l1 When the Feldstein replica algorithm is used, both of the significant coefficients for the postwar period imply that personal saving would have been negative in 1974 in the absence of the social security program. The significant coefficients for the LeimerLesnoy variable imply that roughly two-thirds of personal saving in 1974 was induced by the social security program.
l2 Tests for stability of coefficients for the subperiods 1930-40 and 1947-74 yielded mixed results. (Tests were run only for regressions using gross social security wealth.) For the constant-ratio and perfect-foresight perceptions, the hypothesis that coefficients were the same in both periods was rejected at conventional significance levels. For the current-ratio, adaptive-expectations, and actuarial projection perceptions, the hypothesis that coefficients were the same was accepted. These results held for SSW variables constructed using both the Feldstein replica and Leimer-Lesnoy algorithms. table 3 whose coefficient and t-ratio show any appreciable change when 1971 is substituted as the terminal year is the (Feldstein) constant-ratio perception using the Feldstein replica algorithm with 1930 as the initial year; its coefficient increases to .017 but remains insignificant with a t-ratio of 1.59.13 The coefficients and t-ratios of all the other variables in table 3 remain essentially unchanged when 197 1 is substituted as the terminal year.
Concluding Comments
The evidence considered in this paper encompasses a wide variety of social security wealth perception assumptions, construction algorithms, and time periods of analysis.14 The time-series evidence which we have examined using Feldstein's specification of the consumer-expenditure function does not support the hypothesis that social security has substantially reduced personal saving in the United States. If anything, the postwar evidence suggests that social security may have increased saving. Although Feldstein's extended life-cycle model allows for the latter result if the retirement effect exceeds the asset-substitution effect, we are personally skeptical that social security has increased saving. Most of our results provide no statistically significant support for the hypothesis that social security has had an effect on saving, either positive or negative. This interpretation is narrowly consistent with Feldstein's extended life-cycle theory if, historically, the retirement effect has approximately balanced the asset-substitution effect. It is also consistent with the Barro hypothesis that the introduction of social security simply induced offsetting reductions in private voluntary transfers. It is also consistent with the view that the life-cycle model provides an inadequate explanation of individual saving behavior, a view that is receiving increased attention (see, e.g., Darby 1979; Kotlikoff and Summers 198 1) . Feldstein (1980; this issue) his original conclusions. Alternatively, he argues that if the years after 1971 are included, the best way to incorporate the 1972 amendments is to compute a "revised" gross SSW series by simply increasing his corrected series by 20 percent beginning in 1972. When this revised variable is used, he finds that his original conclusion is supported for the period 1930-74. He dismisses our algorithm on the basis that our modifications are inappropriate if not perceived by workers. He similarly dismisses all of our alternative perception assumptions as introducing errors-in-variables biases if his perception assumption is correct.
Space does not permit a detailed rejoinder to Feldstein. A few comments are required, however (for greater detail, see Leimer and Lesnoy [I9811 and Lesnoy and Leimer [1981] ). First, we reemphasize that our conclusions do not depend on whether the terminal year of the period of analysis is 1971 or 1974. The results presented in this paper would be essentially the same if only data preceding the 1972 amendments were considered.
Second, Feldstein's assertion that we failed to incorporate the 1972 amendments is misleading. All of our perception assumptions, with the exception of the Feldstein constant-ratio perception, incorporate the effect of the 1972 amendments. (We differ in also incorporating the effect of all other amendments.) The Feldstein constant-ratio assumption is the same assumption Feldstein adopted when he first extended his SSW series and estimates to 1974 (see Feldstein 1978 Feldstein , 1979 . He now rejects this assumption.
Third, Feldstein's characterization of the 1972 amendments is incorrect, and his 20 percent adjustment procedure is inconsistent with the actual postretirement, price-indexing provision of that legislation.15 Correctly modeling this provision yields weaker and insignificant results.
Fourth, Feldstein's new results are hardly robust. If we use Feldstein's revised variable but consider only the postwar period, or if we drop early Depression years from the sample, we obtain small, insignificant results. If we simply use the recently revised national income data, Feldstein's results are weaker and no longer significant even for the full period.
Fifth, our alternative algorithm for constructing social security l5 Feldstein suggests that the 1972 amendments not only introduced the price indexing of benefits after retirement but also changed the determination of benefit awards from a nominal earnings basis to a "wage-indexed" earnings basis. In fact, the "wage indexing" of earnings to achieve constant benefit-to-earnings ratios was not introduced until the 1977 amendments. Further, although Feldstein points to the importance of the provision that postretirement benefits would grow at the same rate as prices, his revised series implicitly assumes that postretirement benefits grow at the same rate as income per capita.
wealth provides better estimates of the number of persons likely to receive benefits. Whether or not this provides better estimates of those expecting to receive benefits is not known, of course. But clearly, coefficient estimates based on this algorithm cannot simply be dismissed. Not only does the evidence presented in table 3 contradict Feldstein's results but also, if we use our algorithm to develop a variable parallel to Feldstein's revised variable, we obtain small, insignificant estimates of the SSW coefficient. Thus, Feldstein's conclusion depends not only on his revised perception assumption but also on his algorithm for computing social security wealth.
Sixth, Feldstein assumes that beginning in 1937 workers somehow formed a perception of the benefit ratio over the period 1940-71, ignored all amendments through 197 1 including the fundamental changes in the benefit structure enacted in 1939 and 1950, and then immediately and permanently reacted to the 1972 amendments. We are skeptical that individuals' perceptions of the benefit ratio were not altered by changes in legislation, or by the decline in benefit ratios during the periods between legislation (as long as 11 years). Since no one knows how individuals' perceptions are altered by such information, we considered a range of alternative adjustment mechanisms including myopia, adaptive expectations, incorporation of actuarial benefit projections, and perfect foresight. None of these alternative assumptions about how individuals adjust their estimates of social security wealth in response to new information provides any statistically significant evidence that social security reduces saving.
Finally, appeal to an errors-in-variables bias requires knowledge of the conceptually appropriate variable. Despite Feldstein's arguments, we simply do not know how-or even whether-individuals form perceptions of social security wealth. Thus, even if we were to accept Feldstein's new evidence as reasonable-and we do not-the timeseries evidence as a whole would have to be viewed as inconclusive, since we do not know which assumption describing individuals' perceptions of social security wealth, if any, is most appropriate.
We again emphasize that our empirical investigation has been limited in this paper to the Feldstein specification of the consumerexpenditure function. It is possible that the results will differ under alternative specifications or different variable construction^.^^ It is unlikely, however, that additional time-series estimates will provide a definitive answer-in part because we simply do not know how individuals perceive their social security wealth and in part because of the inherent difficulties of using time-series data.
l6 Lesnoy and Leimer (1981) reexamine the specifications of Munnell (1974) , Barro (1978) , and Darby (1979) . These latter studies all used the incorrect Feldstein SSW variable. Our reexamination supports the findings of this paper. 
